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Abstract. In this note, we revisit the relaxation and rounding technique
employed several times in algorithmic mechanism design. We try to intro-
duce a general framework which covers the most significant algorithms
in mechanism design that use the relaxation and rounding technique. We
believe that this framework is not only a generalization of the existing
algorithms but also can be leveraged for further results in algorithmic
mechanism design. Before presenting the framework, we briefly define
algorithmic mechanism design, its connections to game theory and com-
puter science, and the challenges in the field.1
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1 Introduction
A set of numbers a1, a2, . . . , an is given. The algorithm below finds the maximum
among these numbers.
max := a1;
for i← 2 to n do
if max < ai then
max := ai;
Now, consider a setting in which these numbers belong to self-interested
agents. Self-interested agents may misreport the numbers because of their own
interests. In this situation, the algorithm above will be useful only if we certify
that the true numbers are reported by the agents. To this end, we need to model
and understand the interests of the agents.
The dominant approach to model an agent’s interests or preferences is the
utility theory. A utility function quantifies an agent’s degree of preferences across
a set of alternatives or outcomes. A utility function assigns a real number to an
outcome which defines the level of happiness of an agent with the outcome.
Working with the idea of utility functions, in lieu of preferences, is pervasive
1 This work was done while the author was a graduate student in the Department of
Informatics, TU Mu¨nchen, Munich, Germany.
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and without loss of generality according to the von Neumann–Morgenstern the-
orem. Given a set of outcomes, the preference relationship of an agent identifies
an ordering over the outcomes or lotteries of outcomes. A lottery is a probability
distribution over the outcomes. The von Neumann–Morgenstern theorem states
that for any preference relationship that satisfies a set of reasonable properties,
there exists a utility function that correctly represents the preference relation-
ship [20]. The von Neumann–Morgenstern theorem thus justifies the pervasive
claim that a single-dimensional function (a utility function) suffices to describe
preferences over an arbitrarily complicated set of alternatives. We benefit from
this observation and work with utility functions.
Finding the maximum among a set of numbers is an algorithmic problem. If
we assume each number is the private information of an agent, then we also want
the agents to disclose their numbers truthfully to the algorithm above. Otherwise,
the algorithm will be of no use. Hence, we face a problem of mechanism design
rather than just algorithm design. Mechanism design or implementation theory is
sometimes called “inverse game theory”. Thus, to better understand mechanism
design, we start with some game-theoretic fundamentals.
2 Game Theory
Game theory is the mathematical study of interaction among independent self-
interested agents or players of a game. Normal-form games are the most funda-
mental representation of strategic settings. In normal-form games, agents’ moves
are simultaneous. We briefly introduce normal-form games which will help us de-
fine useful concepts such as equilibria.
Definition 1 (Normal-form Games). A (finite, n-person) normal-form game
is a tuple (I, A, u), where:
– I is a finite set of n players, indexed by i
– A = A1 × . . .×An , where Ai is a finite set of actions available to player i.
Each vector a = (a1, . . . , an) ∈ A is called an action profile.
– u = (u1, ..., un) where ui : A 7→ R is a real-valued utility (or payoff) function
for player i.
Agents choose strategies to play in a game. A strategy can be to select an
action and play it which is called a pure strategy. Agents can also randomize over
the set of available actions according to some probability distribution. Such a
strategy is called a mixed strategy. The set of all strategies for agent i is denoted
by Si. We use s = (s1, s2, . . . , sn) and s−i to denote a strategy profile of the
agents, and a strategy profile of the agents other than i, respectively. Let S−i
denote the set of all s−i’s.
We analyze games using solution concepts. Solution concepts are principles
according to which we identify interesting subsets of the outcomes of a game.
Solution concepts can be seen as a way to predict the outcome of a game assum-
ing some behavior of rational agents who try to maximize their own utilities.
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The most significant solution concept in game theory is the Nash equilibrium.
In the Nash equilibrium, we analyze the games from an individual agent’s point
of view. The strategy that an agent chooses in a Nash equilibrium is called the
best response.
Definition 2 (Best Response). Agent i’s best response to the strategy profile
s−i is a mixed strategy s
∗
i ∈ Si such that ui(s
∗
i , s−i) ≥ ui(si, s−i) for all strategies
si ∈ Si.
Subsequently, the Nash equilibrium is defined as follows.
Definition 3 (Nash Equilibrium). A strategy profile s = (s1, . . . , sn) is a
Nash equilibrium if, for all agents i, si is a best response to s−i.
The other strategy that is of central significance is the dominant strategy. To
define this strategy, first we define weak domination.
Definition 4 (Weak Domination). Let si and s
′
i be two strategies of agent i.
Then si weakly dominates s
′
i if for all s−i, ui(si, s−i) ≥ ui(s
′
i, s−i), and for at
least one s−i ∈ S−i, it is the case that ui(si, s−i) > ui(s
′
i, s−i).
Consequently, a weakly dominant strategy is defined as follows.
Definition 5 (Weakly Dominant Strategy). A strategy is weakly dominant
for an agent if it weakly dominates any other strategy for that agent.
A strategy profile (s1, . . . , sn) in which every si is weakly dominant for agent
i is called equilibrium in weakly dominant strategies. Other types of dominant
strategies, strictly and very weakly dominant strategies, can be defined accord-
ingly. However, in this thesis, we only work with weakly dominant strategies
and, for simplicity, we drop the modifier “weakly”. An equilibrium in dominant
strategy is a stronger concept than the Nash equilibrium. Every equilibrium in
dominant strategies is a Nash equilibrium but not always a Nash equilibrium is
an equilibrium in dominant strategies.
Back to our discussion about mechanism design, let us recall that mechanism
design is in fact inverse game theory. In mechanism design, we assume unknown
individual preferences (utilities), and attempt to design a game such that no
matter what the unknown preferences are, the equilibrium (e.g. equilibrium in
dominant strategies) of the game is guaranteed to have a certain set of proper-
ties. Mechanism design is perhaps the most “computation-driven” part of game
theory since it concerns itself with the design of protocols for distributed decision
makers. However, since the decision makers are not necessarily cooperative, one
can think of mechanism design as an exercise in “incentive engineering”.
3 Mechanism Design for Combinatorial Auctions
While mechanism design is a broad area in game theory, we study mechanism
design for welfare maximization in combinatorial auctions. The problem of max-
imizing social welfare in combinatorial auctions (CAs) is of central importance
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in both theory and practice of mechanism design. In CA, there are m items for
sale and n bidders competing for these items. Each bidder i has a private valu-
ation vi(S) for each package S of items. Alternatively, we say vi is the private
type of bidder i. The social welfare of an allocation S1, . . . , Sn of items to the
bidders is
∑n
i=1 vi(Si).
An outcome, in the setting of CA, is a pair of allocations as well as the
payments to the bidders: o = (S1, . . . , Sn, p1, . . . , pn). In CA, bidders usually
have quasi-linear utility functions. A Quasi-linear utility function is of the form
ui(Si) = vi(Si) − pi: the utility of a bidder i for an allocation is the private
valuation of the bidder less the payment for the allocation. With this type of
utility functions, the mechanism can charge or reward the bidders by an arbitrary
amount of money in order to incentivize the bidders to truthfully report their
values.
A mechanism implements a social choice function in an equilibrium. A social
choice function is a mapping from types to outcomes. In our setting, the social
choice function is optimizing social welfare: maxS1,...,Sn
∑n
i=1 vi(Si).
Bidders choose strategies to bid in an auction. A strategy is a function from
private types (valuations) to actions (bids). Bidders are rational, that is they
bid to maximize their own utility. A strategy is dominant, if the bidder bids
regardless of the bids submitted by other bidders. A strategy profile in which
every bidder has a dominant strategy is called an equilibrium in dominant strate-
gies. We seek a mechanism that maximizes social welfare in an equilibrium in
dominant strategies.
In order to address a mechanism design problem, the revelation principle
encourages us to focus on incentive-compatible direct mechanisms. In a direct
mechanism, the only action available to each agent is to report its private in-
formation. A direct mechanism is incentive compatible or truthful in dominant
strategies if every agent i has a dominant strategy to truthfully report its private
type.
Definition 6 (Revelation Principle). If there exists any mechanism that im-
plements a social choice function in dominant strategies then there exists a direct
mechanism that implements the social choice function in dominant strategies and
is truthful.
In other words, the task of solving a mechanism design problem can be ad-
dressed by finding a direct and truthful mechanism. Thus, we limit ourselves
to social-welfare maximizing mechanisms which are direct and incentive com-
patible in dominant strategies (truthful). In the present text, we use the terms
”truthfulness” and ”incentive compatibility” interchangeably, and by either we
mean ”incentive compatibility in dominant strategies”. In order to use this useful
observation, we have to take into consideration two important points. First, by
using the revelation principle the computational burden of finding strategies for
the agents is pushed onto the mechanism. This fact draws our attention to the
computational complexity of the underlying algorithm of the mechanism. Sec-
ond, since agents have to fully reveal their types, this can place a burden on the
communication channel. In our mechanisms, we have considered these points,
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and the proposed mechanisms do not suffer from any of these issues. Given that
we only work with direct-revelation mechanisms, from now on, we use the word
mechanism rather than direct mechanism.
To be more specific about mechanism design for the CA setting, we say a
mechanism is a protocol with three components. First, the mechanism extracts
a report from each bidder that describes the bidder’s valuations. Second, the
mechanism computes an allocation that determines the package of items to be
allocated to each bidder (allocation rule). Third, the mechanism charges each
bidder an amount of money (payment rule).
If each bidder, in anticipation of the outcomes of the allocation and payment
rule, reports her valuation truthfully, it is said that the auction mechanism is
incentive-compatible in dominant strategies or truthful.
Incentive compatibility in dominant strategies is stronger than the Bayes-
Nash incentive compatibility. In Bayes-Nash incentive compatible mechanism, a
bidder is truthful provided that other bidders bid truthfully. Incentive compati-
bility in dominant strategies assures that the strategy of each bidder, regardless
of the bids submitted by other bidders, is to bid truthfully.
Back to our example of finding the maximum among numbers, if we assume
the agents have quasi-linear utilities, we can model the problem as a mechanism
design problem for selling one item truthfully to the agent whose private value for
the item is maximum. With quasi-linear utility functions, Vickrey’s mechanism
called second price auction solves this mechanism design problem. In particular,
it finds the maximum value reported by the agents and charges the corresponding
agent an amount equal to the second highest number. It is well known that in a
second price auction, each agent truthfully reports its private type [21].
Thus, the algorithm for finding the maximum works correctly provided that
the agents have quasi-linear utilities and are told about the possible payment by
the owner of the maximum number. This phenomena is quite amazing in that
despite the private data and pure selfish behavior, the maximum number can be
correctly found. All the field of mechanism design is just a generalization of this
possibility.
4 VCG Auctions
In combinatorial auctions, the goal of mechanism design is to maximize social
welfare while providing the bidders with incentives to truthfully report their
private valuations. In economics, the celebrated Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG)
mechanism provides both objectives. In particular, VCG finds the welfare maxi-
mizing allocation S∗1 , . . . , S
∗
n, and employs the following payment rule in order to
guarantee incentive compatibility. Each bidder i pays her externality, the amount
by which his allocated bundle reduced the total reported value of the bundles
allocated to others:
∑n
l=1,l 6=i vi(S
′
i)−
∑n
l=1,l 6=i vi(S
∗
i ). The first term is the max-
imum social welfare obtainable without bidder i; that is (S′1, . . . , S
′
n) maximizes
social welfare in a market without bidder i. The second term is the welfare
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of the market without bidder i under the social welfare maximizing allocation
S∗1 , . . . , S
∗
n.
The success of VCG strongly relies on optimizing the social welfare. Compu-
tationally, this is not always possible because CA is a NP-hard problem. Even a
restricted type of CAs in which bidders are single-minded is NP-hard since we
can show a reduction from the independent-set problem to the CA problem with
single-minded bidders [2]. A single-minded bidder is interested only in a single
specific package of items and gets a specific value if she gets the whole package
(or any superset) and zero value for any other package. An essential question
arises here. Can we use approximation algorithms – that are usually employed by
computer scientists to tackle hard problems – and then use VCG-like payments
to obtain truthfulness?
5 Truthful Approximation Mechanisms
An algorithm is an α-approximation algorithm (or has approximation ratio α)
if the the objective value of the computed solution is at least a factor α of the
value of the optimal allocation (the allocation with maximum objective function
value). Unfortunately, approximating the social welfare and then using the idea
of VCG payments does not preserve truthfulness [16]. For instance, assume in a
single-item auction, we assign the item to the second highest bid (as an approx-
imation to the highest value) at the price of the third highest bid. This auction
has no equilibrium because for example the bidder with the highest value would
decrease her bid below the second bid to obtain the item, and similarly, the
second bidder would decrease her bid and so on.
Resolving the tension between approximation algorithms and incentive com-
patibility is the topic of Algorithmic Mechanism Design [16]. In particular in
algorithmic mechanism design we ask ourselves if we can theoretically guarantee
a ratio for an incentive-compatible approximation algorithm with private input
data that (almost) equals the ratio of and approximation algorithm presented
for the same problem with public input data? This problem has been extensively
studied in the last two decades for various types of valuations [2].
Not surprisingly, randomized algorithms have been proven to be more promis-
ing than deterministic algorithms in algorithmic mechanism design. For exam-
ple, the two main frameworks presented by Lavi and Swamy (LS framework) and
Dughmi et al. (convex rounding) are randomized and yield truthfulness in ex-
pectation. Truthfulness in expectation certifies that bidders who are risk-neutral
(expected utility maximizer) have no incentive to report false valuations.
Generally speaking, the two frameworks rely on the idea of relaxation and
rounding. The LS framework first optimizes a LP relaxation of the problem,
and then uses a specific rounding technique called meta-randomized rounding
originally proposed by Carr and Vempala [3]. Meta-randomized rounding yields
a convex decomposition of a fractional point into polynomially-many integer
points. The rounding technique has been successfully applied to mechanism de-
sign with [14] and without money [7]. One drawback of the first presentations
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of the meta-randomized rounding is that, the technique relies on the ellipsoid
method which is notoriously of low practical usability and is mostly of theoretical
importance [3,14].
The convex rounding technique optimizes a convex function which is the
image of a rounding algorithm over a relaxed set of solutions. Convex rounding
optimizes over the outcome of a rounding algorithm, and this way the rounding
algorithm is integrated into the optimization problem. We will discuss both
techniques in Section 11.
6 Approximations to Obtain Truthfulness
Not always quasi-linear utilities and transfer of money are available. There are
many situations in which no money is involved because of the nature of the
problem or because of the law. Truthful mechanism design without money un-
der general preferences is a classic topic in social choice theory. Without money,
mechanism designers face significant obstacles in truthful mechanism design.
Think about the combinatorial auctions setting defined above. The main idea of
truthfulness strongly relies on the payments. Payments enter the utility of the
bidders and are leveraged to incentivize the bidders to bid truthfully. When pay-
ments are not available, the utility of the agents depend only on their valuation
for the allocated package of items. For payment-free environments, it sounds un-
likely for the mechanism designers to be able to provide agents with incentives
to truthfully report their private types.
It is in fact the case; the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem proves that the class
of truthful mechanisms is limited to dictatorships [12,19]. In particular, it states
that any truthful social choice function which selects an outcome among three or
more alternatives has to be trivially aligned with the preference of a single agent.
There have been a number of extensions analyzing more specific domains without
money, all resulting in impossibility results [17,9,13]. To circumvent the Gibbard-
Satterthwaite impossibility, researchers have introduced restricted domains with
additional assumptions to admit truthful mechanisms. For example, when agents
valuations are restricted to single-peaked preferences over a one-dimensional
public space, returning the median of the peaks determines a truthful social
choice [15]. Single-peaked preferences have a single most-preferred point in an
interval, and are decreasing as one moves away from that peak.
Procaccia and Tennenholtz introduced the technique of welfare approxima-
tion as a means to drive truthful approximation mechanisms without money [18].
This type of approximation is not meant to handle computational intractability
but a method to achieve truthfulness. We show applications of this technique in
mechanism design without money for some restricted domains of preferences.
7 Relaxation and Rounding
Usually, when faced with NP-hard problems, computer scientists turn to approx-
imations or heuristics. An approximation algorithm runs in polynomial time in
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the size of the encoding of input data, and returns a provable approximation
of the optimal solution. The approximation ratio is proven with respect to the
worst-case analysis of the algorithm. An algorithm is an α-approximation algo-
rithm (or has approximation ratio α) if the the objective value of the computed
solution is at least a factor α of the value of the optimal solution.
Relaxation and Rounding (henceforth, relax and round) is a well-known and
ubiquitous technique for designing approximation algorithms. The relax and
round technique is also the most successful machinery to design truthful ap-
proximation algorithms that run in polynomial time. For quasi-linear utilities
the idea of relax and round is omnipresent. The idea has also been applied to
mechanism design without money.
Given the significance of the idea of relax and round in the literature, and that
several truthful mechanisms utilize the idea, in this note, we elaborate further
on it. We explain the idea for quasi-linear valuations first, and then we explain
how to apply the technique to mechanism design without money.
8 Setting
In a market, a group of n bidders are vying for a set of items. A feasible solution
is an allocation of items to bidders, satisfying (possibly) some given constraints.
Each bidder i has a private valuation function vi with value vi(Si) for a feasible
solution (S1, S2, . . . , Sn) ∈ S, where S denotes the set of all feasible solutions.
For simplicity, we denote the value of bidder i for solution x = (S1, S2, . . . , Sn)
by vi(x), where vi(x) = vi(Si). Let Vi denote the set of all valuation functions of
bidder i, and V = V1 × V2 × . . .× Vn denote the set of all profiles of valuations.
Denote the profile of valuations of bidders other than i by v−i. Define function
f : S → R+ with f(x) =
∑
i vi(x) for all x ∈ S.
The following optimization problem expresses the social welfare maximiza-
tion problem.
Maximize f(x) (1)
subject to x ∈ S
The social welfare of a solution x ∈ S thus equals f(x). The problem that we
study is to analyze Problem 1 as a mechanism design problem. Specifically, we
wish to maximize social welfare while making sure each bidder i reports her
valuation function vi truthfully. Given that vi’s are private, we build program
1 from the reported valuations (bids). If the optimization Problem 1 can be
solved in polynomial time, then VCG can be employed as a dominant-strategy
incentive-compatible (truthful) mechanism. However, in many cases including
combinatorial auctions, Problem 1 is NP-hard, and we can only hope for approx-
imations of the optimal solution. In what follows, we describe how to employ the
idea of relax and round to achieve mechanisms that satisfy the weaker notion of
truthfulness in expectation.
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9 Relaxation
The idea of relax and round proceeds as follows. We find a relaxation of Prob-
lem 1, solve it and then carefully round the outcome so as to obtain particular
properties. The relaxed problem is as follows.
Maximize L(x) (2)
subject to x ∈ P
Where P is a relaxed set of solutions that contains S, and may contain
infeasible solutions. Polytope P is the intersection of a set of linear constraints
in the positive orthant, and is a packing polytope: if x ∈ P and y ≤ x then
y ∈ P . Function L : P → R+ is concave or linear in x, and for every x ∈ S,
it is the case that L(x) ≥ αf(x) for some α, 0 < α ≤ 1. As we see below, α
will be the approximation ratio of the algorithm. Function L is separable, i.e.
L(x) =
∑
i Li(x), however Li(x) need not necessarily be concave. Let us call L
relaxed objective function. Recall, the mechanism designer has only access to the
reported valuations, thus all value computations are carried out with respect to
the reported valuations.
Given that function L is concave and all constraints of polytope P are linear,
Problem 2 is a convex optimization problem that can be solved efficiently. Once
we solved Problem 2, we proceed to the next step, rounding.
10 Rounding
A randomized rounding scheme r : P → S returns a randomized solution X ∼
r(x) for any x ∈ P . The rounding scheme is oblivious, i.e. it does not depend on
the valuations. Solution X = (S1, . . . , Sn) is always feasible, i.e. Pr[X /∈ S] = 0.
With regard to the expected value of the rounded solution (with respect to
reported valuations), one of the following cases may occur:
(a) E[f(X)] > L(x). In this case, apply an oblivious rounding scheme r′ to X in
order to obtain X ′ = (S′1, . . . , S
′
n) such that E[f(X
′)] = L(x).
(b) E[f(X)] < L(x) but E[f(X)] ≥ βL(x) for some β, 0 < β ≤ 1. Apply an
oblivious rounding r′ toX in order to obtainX ′ such that E[f(X ′)] = βL(x).
In this case, the approximation ratio of the algorithm will be αβ.
(c) E[f(X)] = L(x). No more action is needed, r′(X) = X .
We will refer to the three cases of the rounding, (a), (b), and (c) in the
following.
11 Truthful-in-expectation Mechanism
Here, we explain how to use the foregoing idea of relax and round to define a
truthful-in-expectation mechanism. A mechanism comprises an allocation rule
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A and a payment rule p. A mechanism (A, p) is truthful-in-expectation if for
every player i with true valuation vi and reported valuation v
′
i, we have
E[vi(A(v)) − pi(v)] ≥ E[vi(A(v
′
i, v−i))− pi(v
′
i, v−i)]. (3)
The expectation in (3) is taken over the coin flips of the mechanism. In order to
achieve a truthful-in-expectation mechanism, we propose the following allocation
rule.
Algorithm 2: Allocation Rule.
1. Let x∗ = argmaxx∈P L(x)
2. Let X ′ ∼ r′(r(x∗)) ; /* r′ is chosen according to the occurring
case: (a), (b), or (c). */
return X ′
To define the payments, let x∗ = argmaxx∈P L(x), and (S1, . . . , Sn) ∼
r′(r(x∗)). The payment rule determines the payment by each bidder. The ex-
pected VCG payment of any bidder k is equal to
pk = max
x∈P
L−k(x)− E[
∑
i,i6=k
vi(Si)]. (4)
Where L−k(x) is the relaxed objective function for a market in which bidder
k is discarded, and the allocation rule is run for the society of all other bidders.
Equivalently, we can say L−k(x) is defined assuming vk(x) = 0, ∀x ∈ P . Let
x∗−k = argmaxx∈P L
−k(x), and (T1, . . . , Tn) ∼ r
′(r(x∗−k)). If we let any bid-
der k pay an amount of
∑
i,i6=k vi(Ti) −
∑
i,i6=k vi(Si), then using linearity of
expectation, the expected value of this payment is equal to the expression in
(4).
Theorem 1. The allocation rule above (Algorithm 2) supplemented with the
payment rule (4), constitute a truthful-in-expectation mechanism with a provable
approximation ratio of α (or αβ).
Proof. Let x∗ = argmaxx∈P L(x). Fix bidder k and v−k the valuations of bid-
ders other than k. Let (S1, . . . , Sn) ∼ r
′(r(x∗)). Let C = maxx∈P L
−k(x). The
expected utility of bidder k from reporting true values vk is the following.
E[uk(v)] = E[vk(Sk)]− pk
= E[vk(Sk)]− (C − E[
∑
i,i6=k vi(Si)])
= L(x∗)− C.
Recall, L(x∗) = E[
∑
i vi(Si)] by the construction of the rounding. The second
term C is independent of the valuations of bidder k, thus the bidder cannot
influence it. In order to increase her expected utility, the bidder has to increase
the first term, i.e. L(x∗), but the first term is already the maximum possible
value. Hence, the bidder cannot improve her expected utility. To be more specific,
let bidder k report v′k rather than vk. Let x
′ = argmaxx∈P L
′(x), where L′ is the
relaxed objective function obtained from the new reported valuations (v′k, v−k).
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Let (S′1, . . . , S
′
n) ∼ r
′(r(x′)). The expected utility of the bidder, in this case, will
be lower as shown below.
E[uk(v
′
k, v−k)] = E[vk(S
′
k)]− (C − E[
∑
i,i6=k vi(S
′
i)])
= E[vk(S
′
k)] + E[
∑
i,i6=k vi(S
′
i)]− C
= L(x′)− C
≤ L(x∗)− C
= E[uk(v)]
For the first equality, recall L′(x′) = E[v′k(S
′
k)] + E[
∑
i,i6=k vi(S
′
i)], however,
the utility of bidder k is calculated with respect to true valuation vk. Thus, the
bidder has no incentive to report a false valuation function.
The approximation ratio admits a simple proof. Consider an optimal in-
tegral solution Y ∗ = (S∗1 , . . . , S
∗
n). Since Y
∗ ∈ P , we have L(Y ∗) ≤ L(x∗),
where x∗ = argmaxx∈P L(x). By definition of L, we have L(Y
∗) ≥ αf(Y ∗).
Let X ′ ∼ r′(r(x∗)). By the construction of the rounding, we have E[f(X ′)] =
L(x∗) ≥ L(Y ∗) ≥ αf(Y ∗), the desired conclusion. Similarly, we can show the
approximation ratio of αβ for case (b) of the rounding. This completes the proof.
Therefore, we explained how one can use the relax and round technique
to define an allocation and a payment rule in order to obtain a truthful-in-
expectation mechanism.
The technique of relax and round that we explained here is an abstraction
of the existing truthful approximation algorithms that employ relaxation and
rounding technique. Here, we abstract away from many details of the realization
of the technique. These details are varied for different applications. For exam-
ple, in our explanation, we gave no specification about how to define function
L, or the rounding algorithms r and r′. It is instructive to note that, from the
provided explanation, we observe that the relax and round technique has an ex-
tra step (calling r′) when used for designing truthful approximation mechanisms
compared to the usage of the technique for approximation algorithms. This can
also be seen as a reason for the fact that designing truthful approximation algo-
rithms is more stringent than designing (untruthful) approximation algorithms.
Several truthful mechanisms that are grounded in mathematical optimization
follow a variation of the foregoing relax and round technique. We briefly explain
this observation in the following.
The framework proposed by Lavi and Swamy (LS framework) can be de-
scribed as follows. The LS framework, first relaxes the underlying integer pro-
gram of the problem to a linear program (LP), and solves the LP. Then the
solution of the LP is scaled down by a specific factor (the integrality gap of
the underlying polytope), and the meta-randomized rounding is applied to the
scaled-down solution [14]. For more details about LS framework, we refer the
reader to [14].
In the language of the relax and round technique that we described above,
the LP in the LS framework is closely related to Problem 2. Function L is in
fact the objective function of the LP, therefore L is a linear function. Polytope
P is the region of feasible solutions of the LP scaled down by the integrality
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gap. Therefore, P does not contain all solutions of S. However, P has a special
property: for any v ∈ V , there exists a point x ∈ P such that L(x) ≥ α ·
maxy∈S
∑
i vi(y), where 1/α is the integrality gap of the LP. Moreover, in the
LS framework for every x ∈ S, L(x) = f(x). The meta-randomized rounding
used in the LS framework results in case (c) of the rounding step. Therefore, no
second rounding r′ is required.
Convex rounding is the other general framework for designing truthful ap-
proximation mechanisms [8]. In convex rounding, the allocation rule optimizes
directly on the outcome of the rounding algorithm, rather than over the outcome
of the relaxation algorithm. The convex rounding can be described by the relax
and round technique as follows. Function L is a concave function. Polytope P is
simply a relaxed set of feasible solutions. The rounding scheme ends in case (c)
of the rounding step.
Archer et al. propose a truthful-in-expectation mechanism for combinatorial
auctions with single parameter agents using the idea of relax and round [1]. The
authors employ a linear programming relaxation for the problem, and the round-
ing case (b) occurs. Similarly, Dobzinski et al. propose a truthful-in-expectation
mechanism for combinatorial auctions with subadditive bidders. They also use
a linear programming relaxation and the rounding case (b) occurs [6].
In the solution presented for the generalized assignment problem [10], the
authors use a concave objective function and a polytope which contains all inte-
gral solutions as well as infeasible solutions, and the rounding case (a) happens.
In addition, the authors employ the following new observation. From the expla-
nation above, we know that the rounding schemes r and r′ are oblivious. It is
possible to extend this idea to non-oblivious rounding schemes given that the fol-
lowing condition holds. A rounding scheme r : P ×V → S preserves truthfulness
if for any misreported valuation v′i, we have E[f(r(x, v
′
i, v−i))] ≤ E[f(r(x, v))].
This condition assures that the expected value of the social welfare is maximized
by truthful bidding.
In the literature, the allocation rule defined in Algorithm 2 is termed Maximal-
In-Distributional-Range (MIDR) algorithm. A MIDR algorithm optimizes over
a distributional range of the solutions. To preserve truthfulness, the distribu-
tional range of the solutions must be fixed independently of the valuations of
the bidders [5]. The distributional range implied by the relax and round tech-
nique described above is the image of the rounding scheme:
Distributional Range ≡
⋃
x∈P
{r′(r(x))}. (5)
The (distributional) range in (5) is independent of bidders’ valuations. Since we
optimally maximize over this range, Algorithm 2 is in fact a MIDR algorithm.
12 Mechanism Design without Money
To use the relax and round technique for mechanism design without money, we
do as follows. First, we relax the underlying integer program of the problem to
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a linear program. Let P denote the region of the feasible solutions to the linear
program.We find a fractional point in P by using an algorithm that is fractionally
truthful. A fractionally truthful algorithm A takes v ∈ V and P as input, and
computes a point x ∈ P such that for any bidder i and untruthful valuation
v′i, we have vi(A(v)) ≥ vi(A(v
′
i, v−i)). To maintain a good approximation of the
total value, the value of the computed point x must be at least as good as α
times (0 < α ≤ 1) the optimal solution to the relaxed problem.
Next, we round x using a randomized rounding scheme r with the following
properties. If X ∼ r(A(v, P )) we must have (i) (feasibility) Pr[X ∈ S] = 1 and
(ii) (truthfulness) ∀i, E[vi(X)] = βvi(x) for 0 < β ≤ 1.
This technique results in a truthful-in-expectation (αβ)-approximation algo-
rithm. We refer the reader to [7], [4] and [11].
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